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COMMON LAW REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR
PETROLEUM CONTAMINATION OF SOIL
AND GROUNDWATER IN KENTUCKY
HENRY L. STEPHENS, JR.*
For anyone with a modicum of awareness of current events, it
is unfortunately axiomatic that soil and groundwater contamination
attributable to petroleum leaked from underground storage tanks
(USTs) is widespread throughout the nation. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated the number of
USTs nationally to be in excess of two million, involving more than
700,000 facilities.' Further, over seventy-five percent of the existing
tanks were made of unprotected steel; twenty-five percent of these were
estimated to be defective, and the average percent remediation cost per
tank was placed at $70,000.2 In Kentucky, as of 1995, the location of
more than 38,529 tanks has been reported, and it is estimated that this
number will likely increase. Assuming a twenty percent rate of failure
and an average remediation cost of $ 100,000, estimates place aggregate
remediation costs in Kentucky at between $444 million and $3.16
billion.3 Though costs may be reduced somewhat with timely
implementation based upon innovative remedial guidance, the rate of
UST failure between 1995 and the end of the century is predicted to rise
above twenty percent.4
Notwithstanding the fact that all USTs were to be upgraded to
current standards by December 22, 1998,' petroleum contamination in
the environment continues to be a problem affecting soils and
groundwater on property which houses or may have housed one or more
USTs and perhaps neighboring property as well. Persons seeking to
'Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University;
Of Counsel, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, Covington, Kentucky. Grateful appreciation is
hereby acknowledged to Denise Redwine, a third year student at the College of Law, for her
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
'See Birge, Taylor, and Grant, "Risk Assessment Plan for Petroleum Underground
Storage Tanks in Kentucky," School of Biological Sciences and Graduate Center for Toxicology,
University of Kentucky (April, 1995) (hereinafter, "The UK Study") at B.3.
'Id.
'Id. (citing Blomquist, "Costs of Closure and Remediation for Petroleum Underground
Storage Tanks," Research Reports from October 18, 1993, Status Report: Identification of
Appropriate Standards for Corrective Action for a Release from Petroleum Underground Storage
Tanks, L.V.A. Seindlein, ed., Kentucky Resources Institute, University of Kentucky).
4Id.
'40 C.F.R. § 280.41 (1994); 401 KY. ADMIN. REG. § 42:040 (1995).
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convey property upon which soil or underlying groundwater is
contaminated from petroleum from neighboring sources will effectively-
find that such contamination operates as a cloud on the title, thereby
making buyers and lenders alike reluctant to take title to or a mortgage
upon such property until such time as the contamination is remediated.
This Article explores statutory and common law remedies
available to persons whose property has been contaminated by
petroleum attributable to leaks from or usage upon adjoining or nearby
properties.6 While the United States Congress may have ameliorated
petroleum leaks into the environment from USTs with the underground
storage tank provisions of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984,' causes of action arising under other statutes are alive and well
in the common law and continue to provide non-UST owners with the
mechanisms to seek redress from leaks from USTs.
To date, reported cases throughout the United States illustrate
that plaintiffs seeking recovery for damages attributable to petroleum-
based soil and groundwater contamination have generally alleged
causes of action sounding in common law counts of nuisance, trespass,
and negligence, as well as statutory causes of action under various state
and federal laws and strict liability.' In light the recent interpretation
of Kentucky law in Hahn v. Chevron, US.A., Inc., by the Court of
'The scope of this article is limited to analysis of those statutory and common law
causes of action which an adjoining landowner may assert against an adjacent landowner. As the
Kentucky courts have yet to rule upon the issue, no attempt is herein made to analyze whether a
subsequent occupier of commercial property has a cause of action in strict liability, negligence or
trespass against a former occupant whose activities during its occupancy allegedly caused the
property to become contaminated by petroleum. However, it is likely that the Kentucky Supreme
Court, when faced with claims brought by a subsequent occupier against a former occupier would
adopt the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 642 A2d 180
(Md. 1994). The Rosenblatt court declined to extend strict liability to a claim for economic loss
stemming from gasoline contamination by a lessee of commercial property against a former lessee.
Id. at 187. The Rosenblatt court also granted defendant Exxon summary judgment on the
negligence claim, finding thai the company owed the plaintiffno legally cognizable duty. Id. at
188-89. The court also dismissed a trespass claim because Exxon did not cause any contamination
to occur during plaintiff's occupancy of the property. Id. at 189-90.
742 U.S.C. § 6991-6991i (1998).
'Litigation concerning petroleum contamination primarily attributable to leaking
underground storage tanks is a relatively recent phenomenon. As a consequence, there are a limited
number of reported cases in the area. In the author's experience, most of the major suits have been
settled before trial with the result that the potential theories of liability have not been fully tested
with a court or jury.
'See, e.g., 325-343 E. 56th St. Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C.
1995). In its complaint, the plaintiff asserted the following claims: strict liability, trespass,
common law indemnification, negligence, a violation of the District of Columbia UST Act,
restitution, negligence per se for violations of the Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act
(RCRA) regulations contained at 40 C.F.R. §§ 280-81 and contractual indemnification. Id. at 671.
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,'" strict liability is not presently available
in Kentucky as a theory upon which liability for contamination from
storage of gasoline or petroleum in underground storage tanks may be
predicated. However, as discussed in more detail, infra, ample
Kentucky authority exists upon which plaintiffs may establish common
law as well as statutory causes of action to seek relief from petroleum
contamination attributable to actions undertaken by an adjoining or
nearby land owner.
I. APPLICATION OF THE "DISCOVERY RULE" TO STATUTES OF
LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO CAUSES OF ACTION PLAINTIFFS MAY
ASSERT
Typically, an adjoining landowner may discover the possibility
of soil or groundwater contamination attributable to petroleum leaked
from an adjoining or nearby property when an investigation concerning
environmental contamination on his/her property is undertaken, usually
in advance of a proposed sale of the property and at the behest of a
commercial lender." As most of the causes of action available to
plaintiffs under either Kentucky or federal law will be governed by the
applicable five year statute of limitations,'2 plaintiffs face a threshold
question concerning when applicable causes of action accrue; that is,
when does the statute of limitations applicable to any cause of action
plaintiffs may assert begin to run?
The opinion of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, in Farm Credit Bank ofLouisville v. United States
"0Hahn v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 60 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1995).
"Normally, commercial lenders will insist upon the performance of a "Phase I
Environmental Site Assessment" pursuant to the standards set forth in ASTM-E-1527-94, the
standard practice for environmental site assessments. Such investigations are usually limited to a
review of pertinent records and regulatory data bases and a limited inspection of the site. Only in
the event that the review of pertinent records and regulatory data bases discloses a release of
petroleum on adjacent property or in the remote event a site inspection discloses soil staining on
the property near the adjacent property boundaries will a Phase I site assessment provide
information to the owner sufficient to form a conclusion that the property has been contaminated
by petroleum utilized on adjacent property. More commonly, owners become aware of the
existence of petroleum contamination when a Phase II environmental site assessment is performed.
A Phase i assessment, conforming to sound engineering guidance, provides additional information
beyond that conveyed in a Phase I analysis and generally includes undertaking soil borings,
analyses of soil samples obtained and perhaps analyses of groundwater through the establishment
of groundwater wells or "hydropunch" techniques.
2See infra notes 57-59, 104, 191 and accompanying notes
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Mineral Products Co., 3 is instructive in resolving this issue. In
construing the "Discovery Rule" as applied by the courts in Kentucky,
the court in Farm Credit Bank determined that the "Discovery Rule"
applies to statutes of limitations applicable to claims alleging property
damage in Kentucky. 4 As explained by the court, "The 'Discovery
Rule' can be stated as follows: A cause of action will not accrue until
the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered not only that he has been injured but that his injury
may have been caused by the defendant's conduct."' 5
The court's opinion in Farm Credit Bank concludes that "the
'discovery rule' should apply equally as a matter of public policy, to
property damage claims in situations where the claimant is unaware of
the dangerous propensities of [the] product" [there, asbestos]. 6
To date, the Kentucky courts have yet to apply the "Discovery
Rule" to cases of petroleum contamination. However, given that such
contamination in soil or groundwater may remain undiscovered until
detected through undertaking soil borings or groundwater monitoring,
it would appear that the rationale of Farm Credit Bank applying the
"Discovery Rule" to asbestos claims would apply equally well to claims
of soil or groundwater contamination attributable to petroleum. Thus,
as stated by the court in Farm Credit Bank, "until such time as the
plaintiff can prove some harmful result..., his cause of action has yet to
accrue."' 7 Nevertheless, landowners presented with a Phase I
environmental site assessment disclosing the existence ofpossible soil
or groundwater contamination should consider undertaking further
investigation of site conditions to avoid the risk that a court could
subsequently rule that the Phase I environmental site assessment alone
provided sufficient support to invoke the "Discovery Rule," thereby
triggering the accrual of causes of action."
"Farm Credit Bank of Louisville v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 864 F. Supp. 643
(W.D. Ky. 1994).
14Id. at 649.
"Id. (quoting Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky.
1979).
'61d. at 650 (quoting Hopkins County Bd. of Educ. v. National Gypsum Co., CA No.
83-CI-306 (Hopkins Circuit Court, order dated July 12, 1984)).
"Id. (citing Capitol Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Ky. 1994)).
"See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying notes 16-17 (emphasis added).
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I. COMMON LAW REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS SEEKING
REDRESS OF PETROLEUM-BASED SOIL AND GROUNDWATER
CONTAMINATION IN KENTUCKY.
A. Nuisance
As noted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in City of
Somerset v. Sears, 9 nuisances are "that class of wrongs which arises
from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person of
his own property and produces such material annoyance,
inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume a
consequent damage."2" In addition, as held in the venerable case of
Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd,2' whether a nuisance exists is
determined on the basis of two factors: the gravity of the harm to the
plaintiff and the reasonableness of the defendant's use of his property.22
Kentucky's law of nuisance was codified by the Kentucky
General Assembly in 1991.23 Citing KRS Section 411.550(2),24 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky stated
in Fletcher v. Tenneco, Inc. 25 that "Kentucky's codification of the
common law of nuisance frames the inquiry concerning the gravity of
harm as a determination of whether a defendant's use of its property
would 'substantially annoy or interfere with the use and enjoyment of
property by a person of ordinary health and sensitivities."' 26  In
Fletcher, the court, in ruling on plaintiff's right to compensation in
private nuisance for PCB27 contamination on his property, held that, "as
a matter of law, the contamination of plaintiffs' land by a substance
widely accepted as hazardous constitutes a condition that would
substantially annoy or interfere with the use and enjoyment of property
by a person of ordinary sensitivities."2 Whether the interfering conduct
is unreasonable is determined by evaluating "all relevant facts and
"Somerset v. Sears, 233 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1950).
"Id. at 532 (quoting 39 Am. Jur. Nuisances § 2).
"Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1960).
"Id. at 186.
"3Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.500-570 (Michie 1997).
"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.550(2) (Michie 1997)..
"Fletcher v. Tenneco, Inc., No. 91-118, 1993 WL 86561, at *I (E.D. Ky. Feb. 22,
1993) (opinion withdrawn at request of the court).
Id. at "2.
'"PCB"s are the acronym for a category of polychlorinated biphenyls which are
denominated "hazardous substances" pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1998).
Fletcher, 1993 WL 86561, at * 4.
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circumstances," using a plethora of factors.29 Evidence of negligence
by the defendant is an important, 30 but not necessary factor in weighing
reasonableness. 3' In addition to the court's holding in Fletcher, the
Kentucky courts have long recognized that the pollution of groundwater
by any means constitutes a private nuisance.32
Further, to the extent that soil and groundwater contamination
is attributable to the unremediated depositing of petroleum substances
on soil in the absence of a permit issued by the Kentucky Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, such action on the
part of a putative defendant may constitute nuisanceper se.33 In Branch
v. Western Petroleum, Inc.,34 the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that
where the defendant had ponded oil well formation waters on its
property in violation of Utah law, plaintiff could recover under the
doctrine of nuisance per se, when such waters polluted plaintiff's
well. 35 As the court explained, "When the conditions giving rise to a
nuisance are also a violation of a statutory prohibition, those conditions
constitute a nuisanceper se, and the issue of the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct and the weighing of the relative interests of the
plaintiff and defendant is precluded because the Legislature has, in
effect, already struck the balance in favor of the innocent party.,
36
"Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.550 (l)(a)-(g) (Michie 1997). Such factors include the
lawful nature of the defendant's use of his property, the manner in which defendant has used it,
the importance of the defendant's use of the property to the community, and the influence of [his]
use of property on the growth and prosperity of the community. The kind, volume, and duration
of the annoyance or interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's property may also
be considered, as well as the respective situations of the defendant and claimant, and the character
of the area in which the defendant's property is located, including but not limited to, all applicable
statutes, laws, or regulations. John S. Palmore, Kentucky's New Nuisance Statute, 7 J. MIN. L. &
POL'Y 1, 3 (1991-92).
"Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Ky. 1965).
3'George v. Standard Slag Co., 431 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Ky. 1968).
'
2
See McCaw v. Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1953) (cemetery seepage allegedly
would pollute livestock well); Rogers v. Bond Bros., 130 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1939) (creosote allegedly
polluted public water supply well); Davis v. Atkins, 35 S.W. 271 (Ky. 1896) (privy allegedly
would pollute domestic spring); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Simpson, 33 S.W. 395 (Ky.
1895) (buried cow polluted domestic spring); Livezey v. Schmidt, 29 S.W. 25 (1895) (manure pile
seepage allegedly percolated to house cellar during rains); Miley v. A'Hearn, 18 S.W. 529 (Ky.
1892) (privy allegedly would pollute domestic well); Kinnaird v, Standard Oil Co., 12 S.W. 937
(Ky. 1890) (oil leak polluted domestic and livestock spring). See also, Peter N. Davis,
Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theoriesfor Relief, 39 Mo. L. REV. 117 (1974).
33See infra notes 12, 18 and accompanying text.
341d.
"Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
'61d. at 276.
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In Kentucky, K.R.S. Section 224.40-100(1) provides the
requisite statutory prohibition necessary for the imposition of nuisance
per se in the petroleum contamination of soil and groundwater." This
section provides that "no person shall transport to or dispose of waste
at any site or facility other than a site or facility for which a permit for
waste disposal has been issued by the Cabinet."38
K.R.S. Section 224.01-405(1) imposes obligations on persons
who own or operate a source from which a release of petroleum has
occurred to characterize the effect of the release as necessary to
determine the effect of the release on the environment and perform
corrective action, including remedial actions to clean up contaminated
groundwater, surface waters, sediment, and soil.3 9
Soil or groundwater contamination attributable to a person
failing to undertake the remediation obligation statutorily imposed by
K.R.S. Section 224.01-405 will be deemed to be the disposal of "waste
at [a] site or facility other than a site or facility for which a permit for
waste disposal has been issued by the cabinet," in violation of K.R.S.
Section 224.40-100(1). 4o Therefore, utilizing Branch as persuasive
authority, a Kentucky court could conclude that a defendant's
unremediated contamination of soil and groundwater attributable to
leaking petroleum constitutes a nuisance per se.
4
Kentucky's codification of the common law of nuisance
provides that a private nuisance is to be cast as either a permanent
nuisance or a temporary nuisance, but not both.42  A permanent
nuisance is defined as a private nuisance that cannot be corrected or
abated at a reasonable expense to the owner4 and is relatively enduring
"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-100(1) (Michie 1997).
"Id. The term "Cabinet" as utilized in K.R.S. § 224.40-100(l) means the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-010(9) (Michie
1997).
"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-405(l) (Michie 1997).
"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-100(1).
"Branch, 657 P.2d at 267. As will be discussed in more detail, infra, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 224.99-020(2) may provide a separate statutory cause of action that may be asserted
against a defendant for its violation of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-100(l). KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 224.99-020(2) provides that "[nlothing contained in this chapter shall abridge the right
of any person to recover actual compensatory damages resulting from any violation of this
chapter." See infra text and accompanying notes 195-201. As discussed therein, if asserted as a
statutory cause of action, the five yearstatute of limitations applicable to statutory causes of action
embodied in K.R.S. Section 413.120(2) would control.
42KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.520(2) (Michie 1997).
"City of Ashland v. Kittle, 305 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Ky. 1957).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
and not likely abated voluntarily or by court order." Creation of a
permanent nuisance results in damages amounting to the resulting loss
in market value of the claimant's property.45
Similarly, "temporary nuisance" is defined as "[a]ny private
nuisance that is not a permanent nuisance... ' As a consequence, a
temporary nuisance is that category of nuisance that can be abated at a
reasonable cost.47 In such cases, KRS Section 411.540(2) provides that
the measure of damages for temporary nuisance is to be determined by
calculating the diminution in the value of use or the rental value of the
claimant's property.48 In the event that the claimant occupied the
property during the continuance of the nuisance, damages are to be
measured by the diminution in the value of the use of the property
which resulted from the nuisance.49 On the other hand, if the claimant
did not occupy the property during the continuance of the nuisance,
compensatory damages are to be measured by the diminution in the fair
rental value of the property which resulted from the nuisance."
However, to the extent that a claimant wishes to claim redress
for annoyance, discomfort, sickness, emotional distress, or similar
claims attributable to private nuisance, damages for such injuries must
emanate from a claim for personal injury joined in an action for
nuisance, but such damages will not be awarded predicated on the
existence of the nuisance alone."'
A majority of courts will not uphold a cause of action in private
nuisance by a current landowner against a prior owner,52 reasoning that
the court will not interfere where parties have prior contractual
relationships.53
"Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.530(l)(a)-(b) (Michie 1997). See Kentucky-Ohio Gas
Co. v. Bowling, 95 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Ky. 1936); See also Kentland-Elkhom Coal Co. v. Charles, 514
S.W.2d 659, 664 (Ky. 1974).
"Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co., 514 S.W.2d at 664.
46Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.540(1) (Michie 1997).
"7Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Ky. 1965).
4"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.560(1)(b) (Miehie 1997).
4"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.560(l)(b)(1) (Michie 1997).
-1d. § 411.560(1)(b)(2).
"tKY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.560(3) (Michie 1997). See Kentland-Elkhom Coal Co.
v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Ky. 1974).
"See Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 706 (SD. Ind. 1997);
cf Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 381-82 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (sustaining a cause of action in nuisance even though the plaintiff had no property interest
at the time of the defendant's conduct. The court premised the plaintiff's standing on his present
inability to sell the property in question because of the contamination).
"Lilly Indus., Inc., 974 F.Supp. at 706.
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As most soil and groundwater contamination is of such a
character that it is capable of being corrected or abated at a reasonable
expense, claimants establishing the existence of a private nuisance
predicated on contamination constituting an unreasonable and
substantial annoyance to the occupants of the claimant's property would
likely be awarded damages for temporary nuisance. 4 Alternatively, if
the extent of contamination is so pervasive that it cannot be abated at
a reasonable expense and it is relatively enduring," damages to be
awarded are to be measured by the reduction in the fair market value of
the claimant's property, not to exceed the fair market value of such
property."
Whether the plaintiff's claim is deemed to constitute a
permanent or a temporary nuisance is a critical distinction with respect
to when the applicable period of limitations begins to run. As held by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, the five
year statute of limitations embodied in K.R.S. Section 413.120(4)
governs the bringing of an action in nuisance." Further, a claim for
relief from a permanent nuisance accrues when a plaintiff first suffers
an injury resulting from it.58 However, in the case of a temporary
nuisance, the court in Lynn Mining Co. analogized such an injury as
tantamount to a "continuing trespass for which damages could be
recovered for each recurring injury (subject to the limitation that
damages could not be recovered for so much of the injury as occurred
more than five years before the commencement of the action)."59
In summary, soil and groundwater contamination caused by an
unremediated release of petroleum to soil and/or groundwater is clearly
actionable in private nuisance and will likely constitute a nuisanceper
se in Kentucky.6"
'See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (this relates to the proper measure of
damages for temporary nuisance).
"See supra note 45 and accompanying text (relating to the definition of permanent
nuisance).
'See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.560(l)(a) (Michie 1997).
"Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1965).
Id. at 758. See also Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir. 1996).
59Lynn Mining Co., 394 S.W.2d at 757 (citing West Ky. Coal Co. v. Rudd, 328 S.W.2d
156 (Ky. 1959)).
60In addition to nuisance per se being predicated upon a violation of K.R.S. Section
224.40-100(1), to the extent that petroleum contamination is attributable to the defendant's
violation of Kentucky regulations which prescribe the operation and maintenance of underground
storage tanks (see generally, 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 42 (1995)), nuisance per se may be predicated
upon violations of such administrative regulations.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
B. Trespass
The tort of trespass will lie in Kentucky where one enters or
remains upon the land in possession of another without the possessor's
consent.6 The interest protected is the right of exclusive possession of
one's land.62 The gravamen of the cause of action is the interference
with the plaintiff's current possessory interest in the property.63
Accordingly, standing to pursue a claim of trespass can be found in
both the landowner and the tenant. 64
However, Kentucky courts hold that a possessory interest
supporting a trespass cause of action cannot simultaneously exist in the
landowner and tenant.65 The tenant must establish that the interference
was to property in which he/she had a possessory interest at the time of
the occurrence.66 Similarly, an owner who is out of possession cannot
maintain trespass.67  Thus, a Kentucky landowner cannot sue for
trespass to land his tenant occupies; 68 however, such landowner retains
a future possessory interest in which he may base a claim for injury to
the reversion.69 In this regard, the landowner must aver damage to the
property which affects the value of his interest.7° Liability will extend
to one who intentionally causes "a thing to [enter such land] or.. .fails
to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove."'"
"Bradford v. Clifton, 379 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1964).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 157 (1963-64).
631d
64W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 at 77-78
(5th ed. 1984) (explaining that a tenant may bring an action up to the end of his term with any
permanent damage beyond that time recoverable by the landlord).
"Walden v. Conn, I S.W. 537 (Ky. 1886) (emphasis added).
'See, e.g., Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc.,No. B-C-88-253,1990 WL 312969, at *56(W.D.
N.C. 1990).
67 KEETON ET. AL., supra note 64, § 13, at 78.
"Walden, I S.W. at 538. Cf. Davis v. Nash, 32 Me. 411, Starr v. Jackson, t I Mass.
519, where the courts held that where a tenant is merely a tenant at will, the landlord may bring
trespass, as having "constructive possession."
'9Walden, I S.W. at 78.
70 d. (holding that damage to sustain such an action may be found in loss of rents if the
tenant is forced to leave as a result of the trespass, or damages in the destruction or dilapidation
of the premises).
7
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1963-64). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 160 (1963-64), which emphasizes that this form of trespass is based on the
defendant's intentional violation of its duty of removal: "A trespass may be committed by the
continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor or his
predecessor in legal interest has placed on the land..,with the consent of the person then in
possession of the land, if the actor fails to remove it after the consent has been effectively
terminated." Id. See also infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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Proof of causation is met where the plaintiff establishes a specific act
carried out by the defendant.72
In the ancient case of Chesapeake, Ohio & South West Railroad
Co. v. Etheridge,3 the court established a cause of action in trespass
where a tree was the "thing" which blew upon the land of the plaintiff
and the owner thereof refused to remove it after being notified.74
Similarly, an environmental contaminant has consistently been held to
be such a "thing," as where harmful "waste" was deposited on the
plaintiffs' property and the defendant failed to remove it after the
plaintiffs acquired the property."' Accordingly, courts have likewise
held that invasions of land by crude oil and gasoline are trespasses.76
Significantly, one's liability in trespass is not limited to surface
encroachments, but it extends to invasions subterranean to the land in
which the plaintiff has a possessory interest.77 Indeed, courts have held
that a trespass cause of action may be invoked where underground oil
tanks leak, assuming all other elements of proof for the tort are met."
The aforesaid failure of the defendant to remove the contaminants from
the plaintiff's land is traditionally held to be a "continuing trespass."79
The gravamen of a "continuing trespass" also incorporates continued
presence of contaminants on the plaintiff's property and may also give
"Michael J. Maher & Sheila Horan, Lessons in L. U.S. T.: The Complete Story of
Liabilityfor Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 16 N. ILL. L. REV. 581,602 (1996).
"Chesapeake, Ohio & S.W. R.R. Co. v. Etheridge, 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 758 (Ky. 1886).
141d
75Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21429 (Cal. Ct.
App., June 19, 1991). Courts have further held intangible, invisible gases and microscopic
particles to be "things" supporting a trespass cause of action where the Court obviated the
requirement of tangible physical invasion to property in the case of alleged air pollution. The court
said that the course of science had changed with the times, requiring the bench to reframe its
concept of "things." Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959).
"Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1954) (gasoline seepage from
defendant's pump into plaintiff's water well), cited in Page Keeton & Lee Jones, Jr., Tort Liability
in the Oil & Gas Industry, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1956); cf Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126
A.2d 403 (Pa. 1956) (acknowledging the leakage of slag from defendant's operations to be an
intentional invasion of plaintiff's land, but categorizing the tort as a nuisance, the
unreasonableness of which is a matter of fact for the jury). See also supra notes 20-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the common law remedy of nuisance.
7RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158 cmt. g, 159, cmt. e (1963-64).
"Subterranean" means those invasions "being or lying under the surface of the earth" and includes
"geological structures found therein such as springs." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997). See also North Ga. Petroleum Co. v. Lewis, 197 S.E.2d 437 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1973), where the court noted that contamination of subterranean waters by oil or gas
renders a person liable in damages.
'Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990); Kulpa v. Stewart's Ice
Cream, 534 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Hudson v. Peavy Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175
(Or. 1977).
79KEETON ET. AL, supra note 64, § 13, at 83.
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rise to a cause of action against former owners and occupiers.80
Consent granted by a former holder of a possessory interest is no
defense as against a subsequent possessor if the actor fails to remove
the thing after consent is terminated."' Hence, a demand by the owner
that the offender remove the contaminant followed by the defendant's
failure to do so manifests a purposeful intent to commit an intentional
continuing trespass.8 2 Abandonment of waste which may be traced to
a defendant can analogously be argued to be active disposal without
consent. 3 However, just as a continuing nuisance cause of action will
not lie against an innocent current landowner for contamination by a
prior owner,' lessor landowners cannot be held liable on a continuing
trespass theory unless they actively caused or contributed to the
contamination."'
Typically, in determining whether a plaintiff has established a
primafacie case in trespass, the court's principal focus will be upon the
element of intent.86 It is not necessary to prove that the tortfeasor had
an intention to effect the harm, but the tortfeasor merely had the
requisite intention to do the act which, as a logical and natural result,
brings about or results in the harm or damage. 7 Knowingly allowing
oil to seep into soil or groundwater is sufficient to establish the element
of intent, assuming the plaintiff establishes that the defendant was
aware of the act leading to the contamination. 8 However, an actor's
awareness of a high degree of likelihood that his activities will result in
a trespass may be proved circumstantially. 9 Moreover, a defense of
mistake will not be entertained.'
'Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377,383-84 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (owner v. remote predecessor in title). But see Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem.
Corp., 974 F.Supp. 702, 709 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (owner v. immediate predecessor) (holding that
actions the prior owner took while in "lawful possession of the property that are alleged to have
continued to affect the same property after the change of possession" do not sustain a trespass
cause of action).
S"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 160 (1963-64).




"See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
"Resolution Trust Corp. v. Rossmoor Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 331 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
"Gary W. Napier & Samuel L. Perkins, "Ownership" of UndergroundStorage Tanks,
9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1993-94).
S
7Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d 559.(Ky. 1956).
"Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984).
"Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 786 (Wash. 1985).
9RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 (1963-64).
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Further, a defendant may be liable in trespass even where the
trespassory invasion causes no damage to the plaintiffs property or
interest in the property, as long as other elements of the tort are
proved.9' The action is founded in the vindication of a legal right,92 but
the plaintiff is limited to nominal damages in such situations unless title
to or rights in real property are threatened.93 Similarly, if the
defendant's act causes no immediate harm but later contributes to
damage, the action will lie.94 Additionally, causal intervention of
natural conditions, such as deterioration, wind or rain, in initiating or
exacerbating the trespass will not absolve the defendant of liability.9"
Thus, by way of illustration, where the defendant intentionally dumped
asphalt and asphalt-like matter on his own land in such a manner that
it was carried onto the plaintiff's land by a contiguous stream, he was
held liable for trespass. 6 The court emphasized the act must be done
with knowledge that it will, to a substantial certainty, result in entry of
the foreign matter onto the plaintiffs property.9"
Kentucky law provides a five year statute of limitations for
trespass to real property." However, the designation of "continuing
trespass" serves to relieve some of the strictures of limitations periods
within which the possessor would have to bring a toxic tort claim. 99
Additionally, in trespasses which are temporary in nature but recurrent,
as a periodical seepage, each identifiable incident of contamination will
give rise to another cause of action."° Under these circumstances, it is
important to note that the statute of limitations contained in K.R.S.
'Id. § 158. But see Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
91KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 13, at 75.
"Cissell v. Grimes Invs., Inc., 383 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Ky. 1964).
"Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 300 So.2d 94 (Ala. 1974).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. 1(1963-64).
"Rushing, 300 So.2d at 97.
"Id. at 97. See also Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979)
(requiring "reasonable foreseeability that the act done could result in an invasion of plaintiff's
possessory interest" and also "substantial damages to the res"). See also W. T. Ratliff Co. v.
Henley, 405 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1981). The "substantial certainty" standard imposes a heavy
evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in underground contamination cases but must be met for the
action to lie.
"Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(4) (Michie 1997). An act characterized as a
"continuing trespass" relieves the possessor of some of the strictures of limitations periods in
which he would have to bring the claim. See infra note 101 and accompanying text
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 cmt. 6 (1963-64).
"'Wimmer v. City of Fort Thomas, 733 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
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Section 413.120(4) will not present a bar to such actions, as long as the
contamination is present at the time the action is filed."'
Kentucky law holds that the measure of damages for a trespass
of temporary duration will be the cost of restoring plaintiff's property
to as good a condition as it was prior to the trespass, in addition to
diminution in the value of the use of the property, if any, during
restoration to its original condition. I"2 Courts in other states have
required proof of abatability in continuing trespass actions wherein
plaintiffs seeking to prevail must present substantial evidence that the
condition can be removed at a reasonable cost and by reasonable
means." 3 Without any evidence that the contamination is both subject
to clean-up and that the remediation cost is reasonable, courts in these
jurisdictions classify the trespass as "permanent" and hold that the
traditional state law statute of limitations applies."° In Kentucky, the
measure of damages where injury to land is permanent is the difference
in fair market value immediately before the trespass and its fair market
value immediately thereafter.' Finally, aj ury is warranted in awarding
punitive damages in the case of trespass if the act is attended by
rudeness, wantonness, recklessness, or an insulting manner or is
accompanied by circumstances of fraud and malice, oppression,
aggravation, or gross negligence.'06
C. Negligence
An individual injured by petroleum contamination will often
combine a cause of action in negligence with causes of action in
'"Id. Further, in some recent decisions where the defendant has refused to remove the
contaminating agents after demand has been made, the courts have classified the continual seepage
of contaminants from the defendant's property at the time the action is filed to constitute a
"renewing" rather than a "continuing" trespass. Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C.
1990). The Court noted, "[T]ests revealed that [the plaintiff's] well remained contaminated with
gasoline as of the filing of this action ... [and] [g]asoline was found in the dirt surrounding the
[defendant's] tanks, indicating that the seepage from [the defendant's] property ... had not stopped
at the time this suit was filed." Id. at 596. Accordingly, the Court held that where contaminants
continued to leach at the time the action is filed, such a trespass was "recurrent" and thus not
barred by the five year statute of limitations applicable to trespass and nuisance claims in North
Carolina Id
'°zUnited Co-op Realty Co. v. Morrison, 89 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1935). See also B. & B.
Oil Co. v. Townsend, 192 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Ky. 1946).
"'Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 21 Envil. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,429,21,434
(Cal. Ct. App. June 19, 1991).
1Id. at 21,433.
"'Chapman v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 327 S.W.2d 397, 399-400 (Ky. 1959).
"Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 300 So.2d 94, 98 (Ala. 1974).
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nuisance and trespass. Whether property owners who are damaged from.
contamination originating on adjacent land can establish a primafacie
case of negligence against the neighboring landowner turns on general
negligence principles." 7
1. Duty and Breach
The pertinent duty is traditionally framed as that standard of
care which a reasonable person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances.0 8 However, a defendant may additionally be
charged with any specialized knowledge that he had or should have had
in the conduct of his activities,"9 such as knowledge about the danger
of tank corrosion, tank piping design, chemical reactions likely to result
from normal tank usage, or affordable testing procedures."'
Prior to enactment of federal and state statutory provisions,
there was no formally recognized, legislatively imposed duty to inspect
or test tanks or piping for leaks."' However, courts, both before and
subsequent to such legislative interventions, havejudicially recognized
a general duty to act in specified situations." 2 Thus, such a duty is
identified where reasonable persons would foresee that property of
another is at risk,"' and where the UST should be periodically
inspected for potential leaks." 4 Likewise, courts have established
duties (1) to avoid infringement on neighboring ownership rights via
contamination of groundwater,' (2) to maintain USTs in a reasonably
safe condition," 6 and (3) to act upon actual or constructive notice of a
'0 DENNIs L. GREENWALD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS,
California Practice Guide § 5:171.1 (1995-97). Plaintiffs must show the defendant owed them a
duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the plaintiff suffered injury which was
proximately caused by the defendant's breach. Id. See also Exxon Corp. v. Amoco Oil Co., 875
F.2d 1085, 1090 (citing Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986)).
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1963-64).
'Lerro v. Thomas Wynne, Inc., 301 A.2d 705, 707 (Pa. 1973).
Id at 707-708. The court stated that "[o]rdinary men know that large quantities of
oil soaking into the ground, if uncontrolled, flow in unpredictable directions and therefore involve
a risk of seriously affecting other properties." Id. at 708.
"1'Samuel L. Perkins, Petroleum Storage Regulation in Kentucky, 22 N. KY. L. REV.
59, 62 (1995).
"'See infra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
"'Nischke v, Farmers & Merchants Bank & Trust, 522 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a bank with a security interest in a UST on the landowner's property may be
negligent for failure to inform the landowner that the tank was to be abandoned).
"'Lerro, 301 A.2d at 707.
'Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1005 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
"6Leone v. Leewood Serv. Station, Inc., 624 N.Y.S.2d 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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UST leak." 7 Breach of such duties is found whenever the conduct of
the defendant falls below the relevant standard of care,' and the
elements of duty and breach are often addressed together." 9
Kentucky law has long recognized that a cause of action in
negligence may lie for the pollution of groundwater. In Long v.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 2' the plaintiff sued the
defendant railroad for contamination of her well alleged to have been
caused by the defendant's burial of a dead cow in its right-of-way.',
The court found a duty of "care and regard for the rights of others as a
prudent and just man would and should have in the same situation."'2
The court elaborated that an absence of such care and regard would
constitute a breach of duty if the injury was shown "plainly to be
anticipated, and easily preventable with reasonable care and
expense.'02 3 Although the court in Long did not find that defendant
negligent, the case recognizes negligence as a cause of action available
to plaintiffs upon proper proof.
While no cases in Kentucky have addressed a defendant's
liability in negligence for leaking underground storage tanks or the
generation of petroleum contamination by other means, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, in Exxon Corp. v. Yarema,2 4 held that leaking
underground storage tanks, as well as Exxon's tardy remedial response
to contain the contamination, constituted a breach of its duty to its
neighboring landowners not to impair their ownership rights through
water contamination.' 25 Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in
North Georgia Petroleum Co. v. Lewis,' 6 explained that a landowner
acting with negligent conduct may be liable to a neighboring landowner
for pollution of percolating water, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant has been putting the land to reasonable use. The court noted
that several states recognize oil and gas contamination of groundwater
sufficient to render the person liable in damages to the aggrieved
"'New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
"'Tolin v. Terrell, 117 S.W. 290,291 (Ky. 1909) (explaining that the standard of care
required in Kentucky is an objective standard of knowledge and understanding held by members
of the community).
"'William B. Johnson, J.D., Annotation, Tort Liabiliryfor Pollutionfrom Underground
Storage Tanks, 5 A.L.R. 5th 11 (1993-97).




1d. at 205 (quoting Collins v. Chartier's Valley Gas Co., 18 A. 1012 (Pa. 1890)).
"'Id. (quoting Collins, 18 A. at 1012).




North Ga. Petroleum Co. v. Lewis, 197 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973).
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landowner. 2 7 "Reasonableness of use" is for the fact finder to decide,
utilizing factors such as the "nature of the watercourse, its adaptability




Further, in P. Ballentine & Sons v. Public Service Corp.,'29 the
New Jersey Supreme Court instructively identified a duty of
landowners to prevent any future escape of contaminants from one's
premises once a landowner is notified his tanks are a potential source
of contamination. 30 In Ballentine, the landowner inspected and
removed or repaired some of the petroleum tanks and connection pipes
on his property after contamination of a neighbor's wells was brought
to his attention. 3 ' However, his failure to inspect another receptacle to
ascertain its imperviousness rendered him liable in negligence when it
was found to be the culprit tank.'32 While Kentucky courts have held
that although the law of negligence imposes no absolute duty to prevent
the escape of contaminants,'33 there is, at a minimum, a duty imposed
on a landowner to conduct activities with due care and in good faith.'34
The duty established in Ballantine to maintain, inspect, test, or
otherwise monitor one's tanks was reiterated by the New York courts
in New York Telephone Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.3 ' There, the court
emphasized that a defendant may be liable upon actual or constructive
notice of the alleged dangerous condition if he fails to act to prevent
injury or if he creates such a condition in his manner of maintenance or
service of the tank. 36 Further, courts more heavily weigh a defendant's
failure to act once notified ofcontamination than his inadequate manner
of maintenance, as it has been held that a defendant who adequately
maintained his gasoline UST was still negligent by filling the tank after
it had knowledge of the leak.'37
In contrast, a lessor landowner's obligation to adjacent property
owners does not include a duty to enter and inspect the leased property
at the outset of a lease merely because some leakage is inherent in the
'Id. at 439.
"'Long v. Louisiana Creosoting Co., 69 So. 281, 282 (La. 1915).




"'Rogers v. Bond Bros., 130 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Ky. 1939).
" 4B. & B. Oil Co v. Townsend., 192 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Ky. 1946).
..'New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 172, 175 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
" Id.
'37Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984).
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gas station business which is to be operated there. 38 The lessor neither
has a duty to terminate a lease or even to perform rigorous testing after
notification of leaks 3 9 but meets its duty by promptly remediating leaks
of which he has knowledge. 4
Where duties are not commonly understood by ordinary men,
a court may require specific evidence regarding company policy or
industry practice to be presented to establish the exact duties with
which the defendant is charged. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia,
in Cooper v. Whiting Oil Company, Inc.,14 affirmed ajudgment for the
defendant oil company where the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant had any duty to inspect and maintain tanks, and failed to
demonstrate how leaks could be prevented or even detected by
appropriate inspection or maintenance procedures.'
2. Injury
In addition to establishing duty and breach, the plaintiff must
establish injury or damage.'43 Proof of injury from oil leakage is more
straightforward than in other cases of toxic contamination because the
contaminant is generally detectable by odor or taste.'
Notwithstanding the fact that many injuries are manifested in an
obvious manner,'45 some harms are not as apparent, and courts will hold
the plaintiff to his obligation of proof of damage. Such was the case in
Exxon Corp. v. Amoco Oil Co.,46 where the plaintiff oil company had
purchased property for a service station from the defendant oil
company.'47 The plaintiff succeeded in proving a breach of the
defendant's duty to see that its USTs did not contaminate groundwater,
3'Resolution Trust Corp. v. Rossmoor Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 333 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
141Id. at 334.
14311 S.E.2d at 757.
142id.
'"Johnson, supra note 119, § 6(a).
'"Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Common Law Remedies & the UST Regulations, 21
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 619, 661 (1994). Other toxins are less readily detectable by the injured
party yet may be harmful in minute doses, giving rise to latent manifestations of injury years after
exposure. Id. at 666 n.263.
'45Cornell v. Exxon Corp., 558 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). (The plaintiffs'
children were sickened after ingestion ofgasoline traced to the defendant oil company's USTs. The
court held that there was sufficient medical evidence in the record to sustain the claim of personal
injury).
'.Exxon Corp. v. Amoco Oil Co., 875 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1989).
'Id. at 1087.
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but the plaintiff had "failed entirely" in proving that it suffered any
damages as a result of the breach. 4" Significant to the decision was the
court's distinction that even though the groundwater in the area was
contaminated, no damage had been shown to the specific property of
the plaintiff.'49
Exposure to uncertain but probable substantial risk will support
a finding of injury in some jurisdictions, and a court has broad
discretion in such cases,15 0 so long as its results comport with the
preponderance of the evidence.' It has thus been held that even a
potential health threat can be actionable if sufficiently serious." 2 More
conservative courts hold that the mere probability or likelihood of harm
is not enough, and that the factfinder must also consider imminence and
magnitude. 5 3
3. Causation
It is generally accepted that tort liability is dependent on proof
that the defendant's culpable conduct or activity was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury."4 In petroleum related cases, the
majority of courts have consistently required proof that the defendant's
conduct was "more likely than not" the cause of the plaintiff's injury or
that the injury would not have occurred "but for" that conduct.'
Proof of actual causation has been upheld where the plaintiff
established the proximity of the tank to the contamination," 6 and there
were no other sources in the area nor any contamination until the
installation of the particular UST." 7 Results of leak tests performed to
111ld. at 1090.
1491d. at 1091.
"°Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding
EPA's prohibition of discharge of PCBs based on evidence that was "at least suggestive of
carcinogenicity"). See also Ethyl Corp- v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that no
proof of actual harm was necessary to support regulation of lead in gasoline).
"'National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,453 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"2Reserve Mining Corp. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975); cf Harrison v.
Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1125 (7th Cir. 1975) (where the Reserve holding was
cited to deny damages to plaintiffs based on unpredictable health consequences). See also
Spannaus v. Maple Hill Estates, 317 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Minn. 1982).
"'Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 970 (5th Cir. 1983); Ayers v. Townwhip of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
"Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Spears, 93 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ga. 1956).
"'See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
"South Cent, Bell Tel. Co. v. Gaines Petroleum Co., 499 So.2d 521, 523 (La. Ct. App.
1986).
"'Monroe "66" Oil Co. v. Hightower, 180 So.2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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determine if USTs were "tight" have also been held to be conclusive
as to causation,' as has the expert testimony of a chemist that the
material contained in the UST matched samples at the contaminated
site.'9 Additionally, unexplained financial losses to a business where
USTs were located were held definitive on the issue of causation, 60 as
were unexplained losses of gasoline,' 6 ' and results of regulatory
agencies' investigations substantiating leakage.
62
4. Proof
Proof of causation through the use of circumstantial evidence
has been held to require more than a scintilla of circumstantial
evidence,'63 although courts liberally allow inferences to suffice as the
level of proof that the conduct did or did not cause the plaintiffs
harm.' Thus, proof that groundwater flowed from the defendant's
USTs in the direction of the plaintiffs land has been held to be
sufficient to prove causation.65 Likewise, the plaintiff's compounded
evidence of test results from upgradient and downgradient monitoring
wells, onset of gasoline odor one year after installation of the USTs,
plaintiff's own sample results corroborating those of the state agency,
and witness testimony of observance of soil contamination upon UST
removal has been sufficient for courts to infer that the leak caused the
plaintiff's harm.'66
Alternatively, failing to conduct leakage testing of similar tanks
used by other gas stations in the area caused the inference of causation
from the defendant's tanks to likewise fail.'67 Similarly, the Kentucky
Supreme Court, in Maise v. Imperial Oil Co., refused to infer that the
defendant oil company's tanks caused an explosion in a nearby
residential well where there was no positive evidence of gasoline in the
well.
68
'Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
"'Gaines Petroleum, 499 So.2d at 523.
16Id.
6'Sinclair Refining Co. v. Bennett, 123 F.2d 884, 885 (6th Cir. 1941).
"62Gaines Petroleum, 499 So.2d at 523.
"13Masten v. Texas Co., 140 S.E. 89, 90 (N.C. 1927).
"In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp. 1243, 1282 (D.V.I. 1993).
"65Wilson v. McLeod Oil, 398 S.E.2d 586, 596 (N.C. 1990).
"Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
"61Moore v. Mobil Oil Co., 480 A.2d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
''Maise v. Imperial Oil Co., 137 S.W.2d 1104, 1106 (Ky. 1940).
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Mere location was held to be sufficient to infer causation where
the defendant admitted his tanks leaked, and they were situated over an
aquifer supplying wells. 69 Consequently, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Masten v. Texas Co. relied on the well location in relation to
the implicated UST in finding causation. 70 There, the gas tank was the
only one within a half mile or more of the plaintiff's home, the contour
of the ground sloped from the tank to the well, and a strata of rock ran
from the tank to the well.' Even more significantly, the vein of water
running to the well came from the direction of the pump associated with
the tank. 172 All these geographic location factors led to an inference of
causation. 73 Where several sources within the possession, control, and
peculiar knowledge of a defendant may be implicated, it is not
incumbent on the plaintiff to prove in which specific tank the leak
occurred. 74 Indeed, in Southern Co. v. Graham, the court reached an
inference of causation by the process of elimination. 75 There, the
plaintiff negated other causes and showed that the presence of gasoline
in a water system gradually diminished and had become practically
eliminated, after the removal, testing, improvement and reinstallation
of the tanks and its supportive structure.
176
5. Negligence per se
Just as a violation of Kentucky statutes may support a claim for
nuisance per se, 177 likewise a violation of Kentucky statutes may
support a claim for negligence per se. 78 The cause of action arises
irrespective of whether the defendant breaches the standard set out in
a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation.'" The Kentucky
Supreme Court has theorized that the action lies "because negligence
per se 'is merely a negligence claim with a statutory standard of care
substituted for the common law standard of care."",1
80
691n re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp. at 1281.
7




174p. Ballentine & Sons v. Public Serv. Corp., 70 A. 167, 168 (N.J. 1908).
17'Southern Co. v. Graham, 607 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ark. 1980).
'761d. at 678.
77See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
"'Real Estate Mktg., Inc., v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921, 926-27 (Ky. 1994).
"'Maher & Horan, supra note 72, at 597.
11°Real Estate Mktg., Inc. 885 S.W.2d at 927 (quoting court of appeals' opinion).
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Standing to assert a cause of action sounding in negligence per
se is contingent upon the plaintiff establishing that he/she is a member
of the class of persons that the statute, ordinance or regulation was
intended to protect,' and the injury suffered must be the type of harm
that such enactment was designed to prevent."8 2 Curiously, however, at
least one court has refused to allow a statute, ordinance, or regulation
to supply the standard of care in the absence of evidence that the
enacting body intended to create a private cause of action." 3 In Fortier
v. Flambeau Plastics Co., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals illustrated
these elements in holding that the class of persons envisioned to be
protected by the statute were property "owners whose water supplies
may be affected." '' t The court then ruled that the plaintiff's use of the
water supplies placed him in the protected class,' giving him standing
to sue the defendant whose deposit of waste at an unlicenced landfill
had contaminated the water supply.8 6 However, the court denied
recovery because neither the solid waste disposal regulations which
were violated nor the statutory chapter under which they were
promulgated evinced an intent to provide a private cause of action.'
The negligence per se duty is not limited to injury to persons,
but extends to property damage.' Thus, where the UST regulations,
which were contained in the state fire code, resulted in gasoline in the
plaintiff's soil, courts have upheld an action for negligence per se.'8 9
K.R.S. Section 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory
standards to the status of negligence per se by providing that, "[a]
person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the
offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation,
although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation."'"




I31d. at 602. See also infra notes 194-201and accompanying text (explaining the
legislative intent to create a private cause of action in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.99-020(2)).
""Fortier, 476 N.W.2d at 601.
1851d
1d
"71d at 602. The court seems to have confused the notion that a statutory duty can
supply an element of a common law cause of action with the prerequisites for establishing a
statutory cause of action.
"Mini Mart, Inc. v. Direct Sales Tire Co., 889 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1989).
' ld. The court opined that the statute was enacted to prevent not only fire and
explosion, but also contamination of the soil and groundwater by a leaking tank. Id. See also
Johnson, supra note 119, § 3[a].
15*Real Estate Mktg, Inc., v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921, 927 (Ky. 1994) (quoting KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.070 (Michie 1997)).
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Finally, the five year statute of limitations embodied in K.R.S.
Section 413.120(4) applies to an action for damages to real property
resulting from negligence. 9 '
IIl. STATUTORILY CREATED CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Kentucky Causes of Action
Notwithstanding the existence of the traditional common law
remedies previously discussed, a plaintiffmay be able to take advantage
of a defendant's failure to conform his/her conduct to the requirements
of Kentucky statutes and regulations, and thereby afford himself a
remedy against the defendant to the extent that harm to the plaintiff can
be shown to have been actually caused by the defendant's violation.'92
As many, if not most, petroleum leaks are attributable to leaks from
either underground or aboveground storage tanks, a plaintiff should
evaluate whether a leak from an underground or aboveground storage
tank system has caused the petroleum contamination in question and,
if so, whether the leak can be attributable to a failure on the part of the
defendant to abide by Kentucky's statutes and regulations governing
storage of petroleum in such tanks.
1. Statutory Obligations Respecting the Use of Underground
Storage Tanks
In response to the federal mandate in Subtitle I of the Resource,
Conservation, and Recovery Act, '9 3 (RCRA) that states adopt provisions
regulating the storage and dispensing of petroleum from USTs, the
Kentucky General Assembly adopted the K.R.S. Section 224.60-155,
which empowers the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet ("Cabinet") to promulgate regulations requiring the
owner and operator of such tanks to register USTs as well as to
undertake appropriate release response, site characterization, and
corrective action regarding leaks from petroleum USTs.' 9 However,
"'Kentucky Dep't of Highways v. Ratliff, 392 S.W.2d 913 (Ky. 1965).
"2KY. REV. STAT. ANN. section 224.99-020(2) provides statutory recognition of a
private right of action for utilizing the per se concept where the defendant can be shown to have
violated an administrative regulation promulgated under any of its sections.
...42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
'"Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. section 224.60-155 (Michie 1997). These rules are embodied
in Chapter 42 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations. See, for example, 401 KY- ADMIN.
REGS. 42:060 (1995) which charges owners and operators with responsibility to undertake
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conceived as a regulatory, rather than a compensatory scheme, 401
KAR Chapter 4295 contains no provision affording private persons a
cause of action against one who violates its parameters. 96 However,
K.R.S. Section 224.99-020(2) provides that violation of 401 K.A.R.
Chapter 42 and other administrative regulations may serve as the basis
for the assertion of claims pursuant to the doctrine of negligenceper se
and nuisance per se if any regulation or provision of K.R.S. Chapter
224 is violated. 97 That subsection provides, "Nothing contained in this
chapter shall abridge the right of any person to recover actual
compensatory damages resulting from any violation of this chapter."'
l9 8
The Kentucky courts have ruled that a violation of an administrative
regulation is tantamount to a violation of the enabling statute which
authorized the administrative agency to promulgate such administrative
regulation. ' Accordingly, to the extent that a plaintiff can adduce
competent evidence that the defendant has violated any provision of
401 KAR Chapter 42 regarding USTs,co and to the extent that the
corrective action for releases.
91401 KY. ADMIN. REGs. 42:005-42.200 (1995).
"Id. Indeed, the chapter contains no penalty provision.
t"7 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. section 224.99-020(2) (Michie 1997).
9"Id.
"Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stokes Oil Co., 863 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1988); Home Ins.
Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752, 755 (E.D. Ky. 1966). State statutes should be intricately
reviewed as to whether they do indeed provide a private cause of action and, if so, to what degree.
For example, Ohio UST regulations do not provide a private cause of action. See Lyden Co. v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 1:91CV1967, 1991 WL 325786, at * 3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 1991).
Some states only provide for declaratory or equitable relief, but no monetary damages. See Zoufal
v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 91-CV-70895, 1993 WL 208812, at *4 (ED. Mich. Mar- 19, 1993).
201401 KY. ADMIN. REGs. 42:005-42.200 (1995). The Cabinet, in promulgating
regulations governing the operation of USTs, chose to adopt the federal regulations without
significant modifications. The violation of any one of these technical or remedial requirements,
embodied in Chapter 42, will subject the owner and operator of a UST to liability. Identification
of ownership of USTs became critical upon promulgation of UST regulations because prior to that,
the subject was relatively ignored. See Napier & Perkins, supra note 86, at 15. Promulgation of
the UST regulations thrust the issue into the forefront of industry regulation because since the
drafting of the Kentucky regulations adopted the wording of CERCLA, the terms
"owner/ownership" were used. id. at 16-17. in reality, the discernment between owner/operator
appears to be merely semantical. There is no statutory definition for "owner," id. at I5, and there
is usually no documentation from which one can clearly determine the ownership of a UST. Id.
at 16. On the other hand, just who is an "operator" is clear from the explicit statutory definition.
Id. at 17. Ultimately it makes no difference, as like duties are generally imposed on both the
owners and operators. Id. Additionally, when duties and responsibilities as between the two are
ambiguous, the court may hold the terms "owner/operator" to have their ordinary meanings rather
than unusual or technical meanings. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861
F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988). Owners and operators are bound to performance standards and
notification requirements, release response parameters, site characterization elements, and
corrective action requirements for both new and existing systems. See 401 KY. ADMN. REGS. 42:
020-080 (1995).
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violation can be said to be causally related to the contamination for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery of damages, such regulatory violation
will, under the authority of Home Insurance and Phillips Petroleum, be
tantamount to a violation of K.R.S. Section 224.99-020(2),2°t under
which the person, utilizing common law or statutory theories of
liability, is entitled to damages.
2. Statutory Obligations Respecting the Use of Aboveground
Storage Tanks
An individual damaged by a release from an aboveground
petroleum storage tank (AST) is afforded a more straightforward
statutorily created cause of action than one harmed by a leaking UST.
The Superfund Branch of the Kentucky Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet (KNREPC) is charged with
regulatory oversight of petroleum releases from ASTs,20 2 and authority
to promulgate administrative regulations establishing standards and
procedures for the performance of corrective action for releases from
ASTs is granted to that Branch in K.R.S. Section 224.01-405.2o3 Such
regulations had not yet been promulgated at the time of this writing."'
Alternatively, until such regulations are adopted, the Cabinet is to allow
2OIKy. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.99-020(3) (Michie 1997). Some classes of USTs are
excluded from regulation. See 401 KY. ADmiN. REGS. 42:011 § 1(1) (a-f) (applicability
exclusions); 401 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 42:011 § l(l)(g) (definitional exclusions). Applicability
exclusions are granted to certain tank systems according to their characteristics or uses. Id. These
include tank systems holding hazardous wastes, or systems containing mixtures of hazardous
wastes and other regulated substances as well as wastewater tank systems regulated under the
Clean Water Act See 401 KY ADMiN. REGS 42:011 § I (a), (b). Equipment or machinery tanks
used for operational purposes, USTs of less than one hundred ten gallon capacity, and tanks with
a de minimis concentration of regulated substances are likewise excluded. Id § I (1)(d), (e). The
regulations also offer exemption to emergency spill or overflow containment systems emptied
immediately after use. Id. § I (1)(f). The second class of USTs which are not subject to regulation
are those which are excluded by definition from Chapter 42. See 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 42:011
§ l(l)(g) (citing exclusions delineated in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.60-100). These are
comprised of UST systems which do not fall within the definition of"UST" provided in K.R.S.
Section 224.60-100: "an underground storage tank...or combination of tanks... used to contain an
accumulation of regulated substance" See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.60-100 (1). "Regulated
substance" excludes "any substance regulated as a hazardous waste under RCRA and petroleum,
including crude oil or any fraction thereof." See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.60-100 (2).
Therefore, a tank containing any substance listed as a "hazardous substance" in RCRA is not
subject to Chapter 42, nor is petroleum, crude oil or any fraction of petroleum or crude oil
contained in such a tank or tank system.
202Telephone interview with Eric Liebenauer, P.E., Environmental Assistant Chief,
Superfund Branch, KNREPC (Aug. 10, 1998) [hereinafter "Liebenauer Interview"].
203KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-405 (Michie 1997).2 Liebenauer Interview, supra note 202.
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a person responsible for a release from an AST to use the provisions
found in KRS Section 224.01-400 (18) to (21).0
KRS Section 224.01-400 (18) contains the substantive
corrective action parameters, 06 and offers any responsible party four
options from which to choose the corrective action he/she will take.07
If the violator can demonstrate by use of UST regulation soil tables..
that no action is necessary to protect human health, safety, and the
environment, he may be absolved of the requirement to remediate the
leak.2" Alternatively, the responsible party may choose to either
manage the release in a manner that controls and minimizes the harmful
effects of the release and protects human health, safety, and the
environment,"' or restore the environment through the removal of the
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.21' Lastly, the
individual may combine any of these options to fashion the corrective
action."'
Failure to correct the chosen corrective action option would
constitute a violation of K.R.S. 224.01-405 and give rise to a cause of
action in negligence per se in the event actual compensatory damages
are suffered." 3
B. Federal Causes of Action
Any cause of action the plaintiff may have under federal law
will be governed by RCRA Section 7002 (a)(1)(B).' 4 Although the
205KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-405 (3). See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400 (18)
(requiring characterization of the release and corrective action); KY. REV. STAr. ANN. § 224.0 1-
400 (19) (stipulating exemptions from the requirements of subsection (18)); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01400 (20) (eliminating the requirements of restoration through removal of the hazardous
substance if the violator manages the release so as to minimize its harmful effects and manages the
release so as to protect human health, safety, and the environment); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
224.01-400 (2 1) (delineating factors the violator is to use in implementation of corrective action).
2'ZLiebenauer Interview, supra note 202.
207KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400 (l8)(a)-(d) (Michie 1997).
2"The "soil tables" are guidance standards developed by the Cabinet to determine if and
to what degree a potentially responsible party must undertake steps to remediate the soil.
Liebenauer Interview, supra note 202. (Liebenauer explains that the method by which one
demonstrates that no action is necessary is by utilization of the soil tables to establish that the
concentration of the hazardous substance is at a level below that necessary for action to render the
soil suitable for residential, commercial, or industrial use).
2' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01400 (18)(a) (Michie 1997).210jd. § 224.01400 (18)(b).
2111d. § 224.01400 (18)(c).
"Id § 224.01400 (d).
2 "See text and accompanying supra notes 39-41.
214 RCRA § 7002 (a)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(B).
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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conservation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) Section 107-06 allows recovery for injury from
contamination by releases of hazardous substances, such recovery is
limited."' Indeed, CERCLA contains a petroleum exclusion rendering
that statute virtually inapplicable." 6 Moreover, even in the remote
event that one is able to assert a cause of action for petroleum
contamination pursuant to CERCLA Section 107, such as where the
leaked substance is used oil, the section only provides a cause of action
for recovery of response costs.21 7 These costs, in all likelihood, are less
inclusive than the kinds of damages provided by the common law, such
as those for loss of use and loss of rental value.21 8
Costs incurred from past or ongoing remedial efforts are not
available under RCRA Section 7002 (a)(1)(B), as clarified by the
United States Supreme Court in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.
2" 9
There, KFC Western discovered petroleum contamination on property
it purchased from the Meghrigs. 2 ° KFC Western remediated the
contamination pursuant to a county order, then invoked RCRA Section
7002 (a)(l)(B) to recover costs, claiming the contamination had
previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health
orthe environment. ' 22' The Ninth Circuit allowed recovery, interpreting
the "imminent and substantial endangerment" clause to apply where
harm was posed by the waste at issue at the time it was cleaned up22
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth
Circuit, held that while CERCLA was passed to address many of the
same toxic waste issues as RCRA, the remedies provided by the two
statutes differ markedly.223 The Court held that the language in RCRA
Section 7002 (a)(1)(B), "may present," evinced an intent to provide
recovery of response costs only where the endangerment "threaten[s]
to occur immediately. '224 Therefore, the court concluded, a party may
not undertake a cleanup, incur costs, and then proceed to recover those
costs after the cleanup concludes.2 5
2"CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.21640 C.F.R. § 280.12 (1997).21CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
218 Id. See also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
2
'9Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1998).
...Id. at 481.
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Neither is recovery for ongoing remedies available pursuant to
RCRA.226 Although RCRA Section 7002 (a)(I)(B) allows citizens to
bring suit to require responsible parties to abate conditions that may
present an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the
environment, 27 the court in Express Car Wash Corp. v. Irinaga
Brothers, Inc. held that no costs incurred under a remedy that is "in
place or substantially in place" prior to the filing of a RCRA citizen suit
could be recovered under the act.228 Even though the plaintiff alleged
the imminent danger continued, and that injunctive relief and future
costs should therefore be available, the court denied recovery, saying
that state law provides the best avenue for recovering these costs, given
CERCLA's petroleum exclusion.229
However, the invocation of a RCRA Section 7002 (a)(1)(B)
cause of action is not barred where the plaintiff seeks current and future
unexpended costs of remediation, even though response costs were
incurred prior to the filing of the citizen suit.23 Thus, in Organic
Chemicals Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum, Inc., the court sustained
an action where the plaintiffs alleged contamination of a different soil
unit for which the cleanup would be "different in scope and duration,"
than the unit subject to existing EPA orders.231 Thus the court left the
door open to the use of Section 7002 (a)(1)(B) for mandatory
injunctions to complete cleanup or initiate a different cleanup. 32
IV. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the harm created by leakage from
petroleum USTs is of utmost importance. Sheer numbers of such tanks,
as well as the exorbitant costs associated with the remediation of leaks
therefrom, escalate concerns about potential resultant harm. Concern is
exacerbated by a realization that property already contaminated by a
UST leak incurs a stigma which may cloud the title until remediation is
effected.
"'Express Car Wash Corp. v. Irinaga Bros., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (D. Or.
1997).
22742 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(B).
... Express Car Wash Corp., 967 F.Supp at 1193.
2291d.
... Organics Chems. Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 660, 666
(W.D. Mich. 1998).
231 d
1"2Hazardous Waste: Court Allows Plaintiffto Proceed with Suitfor RCRA Injunctive
Relief at Superfund Site, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2159, 2160 (Feb. 20, 1998).
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Although CERCLA provides opportunity for redress to private
parties in its citizen suit provision,233 the exclusion of much petroleum-
based contamination from the scope of its remedial provisions
drastically reduces its effectiveness as a remedy for petroleum
contamination. Moreover, RCRA based citizen suits are limited to
recovery of current or future response costs. Consequently, state based
causes of action in nuisance, trespass, and negligence serve a vital role
in providing recourse to parties injured by petroleum contamination.
Further, the availability of a statutory cause of action under
Kentucky law through the invocation of the provisions of K.R.S.
Section 224.99-020 (2), obviates the need for much proof associated
with establishing the common law causes of action, at least where a
plaintiff can establish that one or more operative standards embodied
in Chapter 42 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations have been
violated.
Therefore, plaintiffs injured from petroleum contamination can
fortunately avail themselves of ample judicial remedies. The
availability of such remedies serves to bolster the sound legislative
purposes underlying the enactment of federal and state petroleum
contamination remediation legislation.
233See supra text and accompanying notes 215-225.

